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FDI and the activities of foreign affiliate firms have grown dramatically in recent 
decades, both in absolute terms and as a share of world GDP.  Most explanations of 
this phenomenon focus on the impact of the macroeconomic environment on the 
choices facing individual firms over whether or not to engage in FDI.  We focus 
instead on the characteristics of demand for the products produced in sectors known to 
be conducive to FDI.  These characteristics are shown to help explain the recent 
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1. Introduction 
The strong growth in FDI flows and in the FDI-to-GDP ratio over recent decades is 
well documented. One obvious explanation for the former is the increasingly liberal 
investment climate of the period, as emphasised by Safarian (1999) for example.  
Other explanations focus on the microeconomics of firm behaviour.   
 
It is widely accepted that firm-level scale economies arising from intangible assets or 
“knowledge capital” provide a basis for the existence of multinational firms; 
Markusen (1995, 1998).  Given that plant-level economies of scale are generally 
found to be negatively associated with multinationality, an increase in FDI flows 
could be driven by technologically-induced changes in the ratio of firm-level to plant-
level scale economies. 
 
While these hypotheses - investment liberalisation and technological change of this  
type - can explain increased FDI flows, there are no implications for the FDI-to-GDP 
ratio once adjustment has taken place. A further hypothesis concerning horizontal FDI 
offered by Markusen (1998) has clearer implications for the latter.  He analyses the 
effects of GDP growth on the choice facing a firm as to whether or not to engage in 
FDI. The alternative to horizontal FDI is to export directly instead.  An increase in 
market size tips the balance in favour of the high fixed-cost FDI option as against the 
high marginal-cost exporting option. Hence “the volume of affiliate production should 
rise faster than total (two-country) income as total income grows”.  
 
The present note proposes a further, possibly complementary, explanation for the 
recent growth in the FDI-to-GDP ratio. Our explanation is related to the second 
hypothesis discussed above, and applies to both horizontal and vertical FDI.  We 
speculate that the kinds of products for which knowledge capital is important are 
characterised by high income elasticities of demand and, price effects 
notwithstanding, attract an increasing share of total expenditure  As growth occurs 
their share rises, thus raising the average ratio of firm-level to plant-level scale 
economies across manufacturing (rather than within individual sectors, as in the 
technological-change explanation). Thus both the pool of FDI and the FDI-to-GDP 
ratio increase. 
   2 
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the data on historical and 
recent trends in FDI growth.  Though the historical evidence is inconclusive, it 
appears that secular growth in the FDI-to-GDP ratio may be a post-war phenomenon, 
which is consistent with our view that it is associated with the demand characteristics 
of the particular goods that have tended to be produced by TNCs in this period.   
Section 3 reviews the arguments on the sectoral location of FDI activity, focusing on 
financial services and on manufacturing sectors intensive in the use of advertising and 
R&D. Section 4 then employs EU data to illustrate the increasing share in expenditure 
represented by the output of these sectors. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. FDI  Growth 
The activity of TNCs can be tracked through FDI stock or flow data or, more directly, 
by looking at the activities of foreign affiliate companies.  Each  method paints a 
broadly similar picture of recent developments.  We focus first however on historical 
FDI stock data, to show that the rapid expansion in FDI is primarily a phenomenon of 
recent decades; Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Stock of Outward FDI by Source Countries (US$ billion, 1900 prices) 
  1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1971 1980 1990 1995 
World total 
 
11.5   14.6   15.7 29.4 41.9 102.9  156.1 
Australia      0  0.1  0.2  1.7  2 
Belgium      0.3  0.4  0.5  2.3  3.4 
Canada  0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.1 2.1 4.7 5.7 
France  1.4   1.4   1  1.2 2.1 6.1 18.4 
Germany  1.2   0.2   0.2 1.2 2.7 7  11.2 
Italy      0.3  0.5  0.6  3.2  5.3 
Japan  0.2 0.5 0.9   0.1 0.8 1.8 11.2  11.6 
Netherlands  0.7   1.5   1.6 2.4 3.7 6.3 9.1 
Sweden      0.1  0.4  0.5  2.7  3.4 
Switzerland      0.5  1.6  1.8  3.7  7 
UK  5.2   5.8 1  2.5 4  7  12.9  15.3 
US  2.1 3.6 4  3.6 7.7 14.1  18.9  40.9  63.8 
Source: Twomey (2000, page 33) 
 
Markusen’s hypothesis implies that growth in affiliate production should exceed GDP 
growth over most if not all sub-periods.  It is difficult to discern from the data whether 
this was the case until recent decades.  O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, p. 218)  cast   3 
doubt on it, writing that “we do not think that (direct foreign investment) had a very 
significant impact on late-nineteenth-century convergence. It is likely to be playing a 
much bigger role today”.  Another piece of  “soft” evidence comes from Chandler 
(1990, tables 14 and 15) who shows that the numbers of US industrial enterprises 
establishing operations in the UK and in Germany grew modestly in the decades from 
1900 to the 1950s and exploded in the period thereafter. 
 
Our hypothesis on the other hand is concerned specifically with the characteristics of 
the goods produced by TNCs in the recent era, which are quite different from the 
types of goods associated with TNC production in earlier decades.  Dunning (1983) 
points out for example that more than four-fifths of the foreign capital stake in1914 
was directed to less developed economies outside Europe and the USA, reflecting the  
importance of  railway building, the extractive sectors and the colonial control of 
international trade in that era.
1  The vast bulk of today’s FDI is between developed 
countries, on the other hand, and is associated with a different basket of goods. 
 
 That the FDI-to-GDP ratio has grown in recent decades at least is clear from Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Percentage annual growth rates in FDI-related aggregates and GDP 
  1960-70 1970-80 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 2000 
FDI inflows  10.2 15  23 20.8  40.8  18.2 
FDI inward 
stock 









   16.4  7.2  11  16.5 
GDP  8.4 15.2  11.7 6.3  .7 6.1 
Source: Grimwade (2000) for 1960s and 1970s; UNCTAD (2001). 
 
3.   The Sectoral Location of FDI Activity 
How do we determine which sectors are particularly conducive to FDI in the present 
era?  In 1988, Manufacturing and Services each attracted between 40-45 percent of   4 
FDI flows. By 1999, the shares were closer to 35 percent for Manufacturing and 55 
percent for Services; UNCTAD (2001). 
 
Within manufacturing, the shares of FDI flows to the 15 manufacturing sub-sectors 
for which UNCTAD gives data jump fluctuate haphazardly.  Other evidence allows us 
pinpoint more precisely the disaggregated sub-sectors in which FDI is likely to be 
concentrated however. As Markusen (1998) notes, these are sectors in which 
knowledge capital such as “patents, blueprints, formulae, managerial and work 
procedures, marketing knowledge, reputations and trademarks” are important.  In 




Davies and Lyons (1996) provide a division of 3-digit NACE industrial sectors into 
just such groupings. A sector is classified as “Type A” (for advertising-intensive) if 
advertising expenditures in the UK exceed 1 percent of national consumption of the 
product.
3  R&D-intensive sectors are denoted “Type R”.  R&D data from both Italy 
and the UK are used in the determination of these sectors, with relatively high R&D 
expenditures required in both countries if a sector is to be classified as such.  Sectors 
that are  intensive in both R&D and advertising are classified as “Type AR”. Of the 
roughly 100 NACE 3-digit sectors Davies and Lyons classify 13 as Type A, 22 as 
Type R and 9 as Type AR.  These sectors, which are the ones we take to be associated 






                                                                                                                                                                      
1 See also Twomey (2000). 
2 Surveying a range of studies carried out between the early 1970s and the 1990s, Caves (1996; page 8) 
concludes that “research and development intensity is a thoroughly robust indicator” of 
multinationality, and that “advertising intensity has proved nearly as robust”.  Markusen (1995) 
concurs. 
3 The UK is used as it is the only EU country with appropriately comprehensive advertising-intensity 
data by sector. 
4 One simple verification of this is to look at the extent of foreign ownership in these sectors using data 
from the Irish Census of Industrial Production.  We use employment rather than output data to 
surmount transfer-pricing problems. (FDI flow data are insufficiently disaggregated for present 
purposes).  For 1990, the last year for which data were reported on the basis of the old NACE   5 
Table 3: Advertising- and R&D-intensive sectors 
Type A  Type R  Type AR 
Oils and fats 
Dairy products 





Wine and cider 
Beer 
Soft drinks  
Tobacco 
Musical Instruments 









Industrial and agric. chemicals 







Computers and office mach. 
Insulated wires and cables 
Electrical machinery 
Electrical equipment 
Telecom and measuring equip. 
Electric lights 
Motor vehicle parts 
Railway stock 





Paint and ink 
Pharmaceuticals 
Soaps and detergents 
Tractors and agric.mach. 
Radio and television 
Domestic elec. appls. 
Motor vehicles 
Optical instruments 
Clocks and watches 
 
Source: Davies and Lyons (1996), Appendix 2. 
 
Turning now to services, we pointed out earlier that the share of total FDI stocks 
located in this sector is growing, from the level of 20 percent in the early 1950s 
reported by Twomey (2000, page 40) to more than 50 percent today; UNCTAD 
(2001; Annex tables A.II. 1-4).  Within services, the share of FDI going into Finance 




4. Product Characteristics of the Output of Sectors Conducive to FDI 
Our hypothesis is that the demand characteristics of the type of goods for which FDI 
is the appropriate vehicle for expansion cause them to account for a growing share of 
aggregate expenditure.  We are suggesting essentially that these are high-income-
                                                                                                                                                                      
categories used by Davies and Lyons, these three groups of sectors accounted for 62 percent of the jobs 
in foreign-owned industry, and for only 26 percent of jobs in domestically-owned industry.  
5 This is true for both years shown in the UNCTAD tables, 1988 and 1999, and for both Developed 
Country and World FDI stocks.   6 
elasticity-of-demand products.
6  We are not concerned with estimating demand curves 
however.  Rather, our concern is with outcomes, in terms of the share in total 
expenditure accounted for by these sectors.   
 
Our hypothesis will be confirmed if we find that the output of R&D and advertising-
intensive sectors is growing as a share of total spending on manufactures, and that 
Finance and Business Activities are growing as a share of spending on  services.
7       
 
To determine this we would ideally like to have data on world production, which 
would then yield world demand.  These data are unavailable however.  We do have 
consistent trade and production data for EU manufacturing; if EU supply is 
sufficiently close to EU apparent consumption (i.e. production plus imports minus 
exports), then we can view the EU as a closed economy as far as these goods are 
concerned, and equate production and expenditure.   
 
Table 4 below confirms that this is the case.  For the year to which the data refer, 
1995, the gap between EU production of these goods and EU expenditure on them is 







                                                            
6 Even if this were the case, relative price changes could nevertheless cause them to decline as a share 
of expenditure.  We do not think this is likely however.  For the goods in which technical progress is 
rapid (primarily the Type R sectors), De Long and Summers (2000) argue that price elasticities of 
demand are likely to be high; as their relative price falls due to technical progress, this protects their 
expenditure shares. Given that advertising aims to reduce price elasticity we might expect  generally 
low price elasticities for the advertising-intensive Type A sectors; as their relative price rises, their 
share of consumption is protected. 
7 Furthermore, several of the most service-intensive manufacturing industries (i.e. Office and 
Computing, Communications Equipment and Drugs and Medicines, out of the top 5 mentioned by 
Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000) are also FDI intensive, as measured by a higher than average share of 
foreign affiliates in total US firms’ foreign sales, which is related to the measure employed by Dunning 
et al. (2001).  Thus the growth in the share of services is not necessarily unrelated to FDI growth 
generally. 
8 Ideally one might wish to show that this is the case for each year of the analysis. This is a greater task 
than might appear at first sight however as the sectoral classifications and the membership of the EU 
both change over time. (In fact the definitions of the A, R and AR sectors in Table 4 use the Altomonte 
concordance discussed below). A cursory inspection of the data reveals that 1995 is not an atypical 
year however.   7 
Table 4:  Absolute Value of Imports minus Exports as a Share of Production, 1995. 
  Total 
(A+R+AR) 
A R AR 
EU15  4.65 3.95 6.07 6.52 
EU12  5.20 3.23 7.12 6.23 
Source: Production data from the Daisie database, 1995, coded according to NACE Rev 1.  Trade data 
from Eurostat Comext database, 1995, coded according to Combined Nomenclature 2001.  A 
concordance between the two classifications was carried out, and the trade data converted to NACE 
Rev1. 
  
The next two tables confirm that these sectors have expanded as a share of EU 
production over time. The tables differ in terms of the number of EU member states 
included (because the appropriate data typically become available only upon a 
country’s accession to the EU ), and in terms of the time periods considered, because 
of the changes made to the NACE coding system in the early 1990s.  
 
Our longest data series is for the EU9 (i.e. the original six member states plus the UK, 
Denmark and Ireland). Table 5 shows the share of EU9 manufacturing-sector 
production accounted for by the A, R and AR sectors rising by 14 percentage points  
between 1975 and 1990. We have a somewhat shorter data series for the EU12 (i.e. 
the EU9 plus Greece, Spain and Portugal).  For these the share of manufacturing 




Table 5:  Shares of Type A, R and AR sectors in Total Production; various years 
(NACE 1970) 
  1975 1982  1990* 
EU12 (A+R+AR)    48.08  51.13 
      of which:  A    12.15  10.72 
                        R    23.95  25.24 
                        AR    11.99  15.17 
      
EU9  (A+R+AR)  37.61  51.77 
      of which:  A  14.38    10.32 
                        R  17.94    26.27 
                        AR  5.28    15.18 
      
Source: Eurostat Structure and Activity of Industry (NACE 1970)  
*: For Portugal and Belgium we only have the 1989 value which we use in place of 1990. 
   8 
Because of the changes made to the NACE coding system in the early 1990s, the data 
for that decade are not directly comparable with those for previous periods. Altomonte 
(2000) has recently reclassified the Davies and Lyons sectors in line with the new 
NACE coding system however and we adopt his concordance for the post-1990 
period.
10   Table 6 shows that while the share of A,R and AR sectors in NACE Rev1 
appears to be lower than in NACE 1970, the share continues to rise over time. 
 
Table 6:  Shares of Type A, R and AR sectors in Total Production; various years 
(NACE Rev 1) 
  1990 1997 
EU15 (A+R+AR)  41.18  43.75 
      of which:  A  8.44  6.49 
                        R  19.85  22.60 
                        AR  12.89  14.66 
    
EU12 (A+R+AR)  42.42  44.32 
      of which:  A  8.80  6.61 
                        R  20.38  23.12 
                        AR  13.25  14.58 
    
EU9 (A+R+AR)  42.86  44.57 
      of which:  A  8.62  6.29 
                        R  20.93  23.78 
                        AR  13.30  14.50 
    
Source: Eurostat DAISIE (NACE Rev1). 
 
Finally, we turn our attention to Services. Here data availability requires that we focus 
on gross value added rather than production.  This means that we cannot carry out an 
analysis equivalent to that appearing in Table 4 above, which allowed us equate 
production with expenditure.  In the case of services however this might not be overly 
problematic, given the presumption that services are less tradable internationally than 
are manufactured goods.   
 
The equivalent to the Finance and Business Activities sub-sector in the FDI data is the 
FIRE sub-sector in the output data. This comprises Financial Institutions, Insurance, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Similar conclusions are arrived at in each case by looking at employment and value added shares in 
manufacturing.   9 
Real Estate and Business Services. As in the case of manufacturing, the precise make 
up of this category changed in the 1990s with the switch from ISIC Rev 2 to ISIC Rev 
3.  As Tables 7 and 8 show, however, FIRE as a proportion of total services value 
added grew throughout the entire period under discussion.  
 
Table 7:  Share of FIRE in Total Services – ISIC Rev 2 
  FIRE as % of Total Services GVA 
  1970 1982 1994 
EU8  19.76 27.72 31.38 
EU11   27.16  30.11 
EU14   27.10  31.20 
Source: Services GVA data: OECD Services Statistics on Valued Added and Employment, editions 
1996 and 2000, exchange rates: IMF IFS Yearbook 2000. 
Notes: No data for Ireland available. 
 
 
Table 8:  Share of FIRE in Total Services – ISIC Rev 3 
  FIRE as % of Total  Services GVA 
 1991  1995  1998 
EU7 38.75  40.36  41.44 
EU8   40.41  41.49 
EU11   39.43  40.43 
EU14   39.11  40.08 




We have offered here an explanation for the growth in the FDI-to-GDP ratio seen 
over recent decades. We have argued that it reflects in part the fact that post-war FDI 
is concentrated in products that display high income elasticities of demand.  As 
income grows, these sectors grow more rapidly, as does the scope for FDI.  In 
microeconomic terms our argument is that as the share in expenditure of products 
embodying “knowledge capital” rises, so too does the average ratio of firm-level to 
plant-level scale economies.  This raises both the pool of FDI and the FDI-to-GDP 
ratio. 
 
Our use of trade and production data showed that R&D-intensive and advertising-
intensive products do indeed account for a growing share of EU expenditure on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 Again we can verify on Irish data the extent to which these sectors are associated with 
multinationality. For 1998, Altomonte’s grouping of the Davies and Lyons sectors accounts for 68 
percent of jobs in foreign-owned industry, compared to just 24 percent of jobs in indigenous industry.   10 
manufactures, and these are generally agreed to be the manufacturing sectors most 
conducive to FDI activity.  Within services, we have seen that the same holds true for 
Finance and Business Activities. 
 
Our findings are of relevance to at least one current policy debate, concerning the 
likely implications for current EU incumbents of eastwards enlargement of the EU.  
Some incumbents are fearful that FDI flows may be diverted away from them.  
Braconier and Ekholm (2001) have shown for example that the opening-up of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) diverted Swedish multinational activity away from 
Southern Europe, while Barry and Hannan (2001) have suggested that Ireland’s FDI 
inflows may also be threatened, given the low corporation tax rates and labour costs 
and reasonably high educational standards prevailing in some of the more advanced 
CEE countries.  Such fears may receive further support from recent work by  Neary 
(2002) who points out that the development of a free trade area (FTA) can reduce 
overall FDI, for two reasons.  Firstly, reductions in inter-FTA tariffs reduce the tariff-
jumping incentive to set up more than one FDI plant in the area, and secondly, 
reduced internal tariffs also lead to increased competition from domestic firms, which 
works against both FDI and exports.   
 
If the products produced in the sectors that generate most FDI are income-elastic, on 
the other hand, as the present analysis suggests, this means that the growth effects of 
enlargement are likely to increase the total pool of FDI within the expanded EU, as 
the historical evidence adduced by Dunning (1997a,b) would also suggest.   11 
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